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The Polish chemical industry has been the object of a dispropor-
tionately large number of antidumping cases - not because the
industry dumps but because it is so eas) to win an antidumping
case against a socialist country's exports.
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In the early  1  980s, the Polish chemical indtustry  Perhaps the most striking finding of  ltle
got caught up in a battle waged by the European  study is what it tells us about the business ethics
Community's  chemical industry to preserve the  implicit in antidumping regulation.  This ethic
EC market for itself.  The Polish share of that  stresses collective behavior and the resolution of
market was very small, and the performance of  economic questions through political negotiation
the Polish companies did not depend on it, so  and compromise. The business behavior the
they emerged from the battle unscatlhcd.  antidumping rules attcmpt to impose on is in
direct conflict with the antimonopoly laws - a
But an aftertaste of the experience remained.  basic patn of the business ethics of a market
Interviews with representatives of the companies  system - hut it fits well into the business ethics
involved indicate that their recollection of the  of a nonma  vet economy,  As an interface
antidumping investigations is vivid.  Pressed for  between the two systems, the antidumping rules
reasons, they said that what impressed them the  teach the capitalists to behave like socialists -
most about the actions was the inconvenience  rather thlani  to teach the socialists to behave as
associateu wiut tucin, the burden of prepanng  capitalists.  No wonder the socialists came out
explanations and reports for the Polish authori-  well.
ties, and the international aspect of the activities.
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Notes  26Chemicals  from  Poland:
A Tempest  in a Teacup
Andrzei  Olechowski
The  European  Community  (EC)  initiated  a  barrage  of antidv1mping  actions
against  chemical  imports  during  the  early  1980s,  a  particularly  difficult
period  for  the  West European  chemical  industry.  Exactly  how  many  complaints
were lodged  is unknown  since  the  EC does  not  maintain  public  records  of
antidumping  complaints;  what is  known  is that  forty-nine  complaints  qualified
for  formal  investigation  from 1980  to 1985,  for  a total  of 102  investigation3
(most  involved  more than  one  country;  see  table  1).  The  largest  share  of
complaints  were brought  against  the  Eastern  European  state  trading  nations  --
about  46 percent.  Of these,  15  percent  were against  Polish  producers.  Cases
against  industrial  country  producers,  by comparison,  constituted  37 percent  of
investigations.
What accounted  for  the  large  share  of complaints  against  producers  from
Poland  and  other  Eastern  European  countries,  whose share  of the  EC  market  was
a scant  3 percent?  Polish  producers  seem  to have  gotten  caught  up in the
general  frenzy  of the  battle  waged  by the  EC chemical  industry  to preserve  the
EC market  for itself  by excluding  foreign  competition  large  or small.  Polish
producers,  like  those  in  other  Eastern  European  countries,  were an easy
target;  export  volume  was largely  a matter  of th'e  surplu  o-ver  domestic
consumption  and  was fairly  insensitive  to short-run  variations  in  export
prices.  So Eastern  European  producers  could  generally  be counted  on to accept
price  undertakings.  The  EC antidumping  actions  had  very little  effect  on the
Polish chemical industry. The  affected trade --  less than $7 million --
accounted  for  less  than  0.1  percent  of total  production,  less  than  0.6  percent
of total  exports,  and  a little  over  1  percent  of exports  in convertible
currencies.The  Polish  chemical  industry
The chemical  industry  in  Poland  dates  back  to salt  mining  operations
south  of Cracow  in  the fifteenth  century.  The beginning  of the  modern  chemical
industry  can  be traced  back  to the  early  1920s,  after  the  formation  of the  ncw
Polish  state.  Under  the leadership  of the  chemical  engineer-statesman  Ignacy
Moscicki,  the  huge complex  at Tarnow  in southeastern  Poland  was completed  in
1927,  placing  Poland  among  the  modern  industrial  nations.  The  industry
expanded  rapidly  during  World  War II,  when Polish  plants  were used  for  wartime
production  under  German  occupation.  The  plants  were heavily  bombed  during  the
war. Some  of the  equipment  that  survived  was taken  to  Germany  by retreating
forces,  and  the rest  was later  removed  by the  Soviet  Union  as  war reparations.
As a result,  the  Polish  chemical  indu  ,-r.Y  had  to be almost  entirely  rebuilt
after  the  war.
The  new plants  were designed,  constructed,  and  equipped  by local
engineers  and  workers  using  mostly  local  technology.  Production  was geared
toward  domestically  available  raw  materials.  Until  the 1960s,  efforts
concentrated  on getting  the  new  units  operating.  Very little  expansion
occurred.  Then in 1964,  the first  major  complex  was initiated  at Plock.  The
Plock  complex  was followed  by another  at Wloclawek  in the  late 19608,  one in
Pulawy  in 1970,  and  the  modern  plant  at Police  in the  mid-1970s.  (For  more
detail,  see  World  Bank 1987).
After  a period  of rapid  growth  from 1970  to 1980,  production  stagnated,
despite  a chronic  inability  to  meet domestic  demand,  because  of shortages  of
materials  and  a  slowdown  in investment.  The  industry  suffered  from  a high
degree  of product  imbalance.'  Too  much emphasis  went to inorganic  chemicals
and  those  derived  from  coal  and  not enough  to organic  chemicals,  especially
petrochemicals. 2 Other  problems  included  lack  of specialization,  poor
financial  management,  weak marketing,  overemployment,  and  high levels  of
pollution  and  worker  health  hazards.
-2-In 1987, the Polish chemical industry consisted of some 600 enterprises
employing about 300,000 workers and producing goods worth about $10 billion.
Parts of the industry operated at world-class levels of efficier.cy,  while
others lagged behind, struggling with antiquated plants and obsolete
technology. The top twenty-five enterprises, employing about 116,000  workers,
had combined sale2 of some $5.8 billion in 1985. To put this productivity
figure in perspective, consider that Dow Chemical of the United States had
sales of $11.1 billion in 1986 produced by 51,300 employees, while the large
Dutch chemical and energy company DSM was even more productive, with 28,000
workers and sales of $10 billion in 1986. Although these figures are not
strictly comparable, they are an indication of the low output per worker in
the Polish chemical industry.
Despite these shortcomings, the industry had a significant impact on the
national economy. In 1985, it accounted for 9 percent of total industrial
sales  and 6  percent  of employment  (table  2).  It contributed  just  under  4
percent  of national  income  and  absorbed  just  over 3  percent  of national
investment.  Its  contribution  to trade  was especially  important,  accounting  for
some 13  percent  of imports  and 10  percent  of exports  --  12  percent  of hard
currency  exports.
Unlike  several  other  industries  in Poland,  such  as food  processing,
miring;  and  leather  and  textiles,  the  chemical  industry  received  no special
government  assistance  in the 1980s.  Rather,  it simply  experienced  both the
advantages  and  disadvantages  of the  centrally  commanded  economy:  insulation
from  the  world  market,  central  allocation  and  control  of  prices  of inputs  and
output,  and central  approval  of growth  and development  plans  and  central
allocation  of the  necessary  resources.
Chemical  prices,  like  those  of  other  products,  were of three  types:
administered,  regulated,  or contractual.  Administered  prices  were fixed  by
Parliament  on the  recommendation  of the  Council  of  Ministers  at a  uniform
level  for  a given  commodity.  Regulated  prices  were fixed  at a nonuniform  level
set  according  to a cost-based  formula  for  each  producer.  Contractual  prices
-3-were determined  by negotiation  between  seller  and  buyer.  Where  administered
prices  would cause  losses,  enterprises  were compensated  for  the  difference
between  the  price  and  the  actual  cost  of production.
Tablr  3 gives  some  idea  of price  levels  in  Poland  for  a  number  of
chemicals  in 1985.  At the  official  exchange  rate,  domestic  prices  for  these
products  were in general  close  to their  respective  economic  prices,  with the
exception  of caustic  soda,  melamine,  MDI, polypropylene,  and  viscose  pulp,
whose domestic  prices  were about  two-thirds  of their  economic  prices.  But  if
prices  are  calculated  at an indicative  rate  of 400  zloty  (ZL)  to the  U.S.
dollar,  which  ia  between  the  official  rate  of ZL 240/US$l  in 1987  and the  free
market  rate  of ZL 1,000/US$i,  not one  of these  prodttcts  would  be priced  close
to it economic  cost.
Polish  foreign  trade  policies
Until  1982,  producing  enterprises  in  Poland  could  not ergage  in export
or import  transactions  on their  own,  but  had  to use  the services  or foreign
trade  organizations.  The  foreign  trade  organization  actually  took  title  to the
goods  and  resold  them  on  world  markets.  The  trade  organizations  paid  producers
for  their  goods  in  domestic  currency  and  received  hard  currency  for  their
export  sales.
Under  the  reform  of 1982,  enterprises  with qualified  staff  and  with
exports  worth over  ZL 1  billion  or accounting  for  at least  25  percent  of total
sales  could  obtain  a foreign  trade  license. 3 The  reform  also  allowed
producers  more freedom  in selecting  a  foreign  trad-  organization.  This
liberalization  had little  effect  in the  chemical  sector,  however,  si.;ce  only
one  trade  organization  (Ciech)  specialized  in services  for  chemicals  (Parkola
and  Rapacki  1986,  13).  But chemical  producers  did  gain  greater  influence  over
export  activities  through  another  provision  of the  reform  that  permitted
foreign  trade  organizations  to form  joint  stock  companies,  and industrial  and
foreign  companies  to become  shareholders.  Ciech  was transformed  into  a joint
-4stock  company,  which gave  producers  some influence  over  its  strategy  and
operations.
Licenses  were need  to export  or import  a  product.  The objective  of
export  licer..3ing  was  to protect  supply  for  the domestic  market  and  to avoid
"cutthroat  price  competition  amo.ag  Polish  enterprises  in export  markets"
(Soldaczuk  1984,  11).  Exports  were allowed  only  when the  licensing  authorities
(the  ministry  of foreign  trade  and the  planining  commission)  were assured  that
domestic  needs  were adequately  covered.  Gives.  this  system  and  Poland's  low
share  in international  trade (less  than 1  percent  of total  world exports,  and
about  0.5  percent  of  world  chemical  exports),  and  thus  the large,  elastic
demand  for  Polish  goods,  foreign  trade  organizations  were constantly  searching
for  products  to sell  abroad.  Import  licenses  (open,  general,  and specific)
were retained  for  balance  of payments  reasons.
Market  strategy,  pricing,  and  actual  trade  transactions  were the
responsibility  of the  foreign  trade  organization,  and  in the  transactions  it
handled,  there  was no direct  connection  between  buyer  and  seller  in a
financial  or commercial  sense.  Foreign  trade  organizations  set  export  prices
at the level  needed  to make a sale.  Although  they  tried  to get the  best prices
they could,  they  had  a tendency  to  unidercut  the  market  to gain  entrance  --  a
normal  trading  practice  given  Poland's  minor  position  in  most markets.  As in
Aompst4c  sales.  producers  were paid administered,  regulated,  or contractual
prices.  Administered  and  regulated  prices  applied  to raw  materials  and
semifinished  products  and  accounted  for  some  40 to 45 percer.t  of exports  and
imports.  An equalization  account  was established  to collect  taxes  on  products
for  which the  administered  import  prices  were lower  than  domestic  prices  and
to  pay subsidies  on products  for  which  administered  export  prices  were lower
than the  domestic  prices.
Another  important  reform  in 1982  gave  exporters  (initially  traders,
later  producers  as  well) "retention  quotas"!  or entitlements  to purchase
foreign  exchange  up to a fixed  percentage  of their  past  export  earnings.  This
right to repurchase --  and later to retain --  a part of export earnings proved
-5-to be an effective  export  incentive.  Imports  fiLanced  from  firms'  own foreign
exchange  accounts  inoreased  rapidly  from  3 percent  in 1982  to 15  percent  in
1985  and  more than  50 percent  in 1989,  when the  system  expired  with the
introduction  of limited  convertibility  for  the  zloty.  Exporting  producers  were
also eligible  for  reductions  in income  and "excess  wage"  taxes.  (The  excess
wage tax  was part  of the government's  effort  to control  the growth  of  wages,
particularly  in the  late 1980s.)  A system  of special  export  bonuses  was also
established.  Bonuses,  granted  by the  ministry  of foreign  trade,  were exempt
from income  and  wage taxes  and  were available  only  to  producers  that  did  not
benefit  from  government  subsidies,  that  is,  those  whose  export  prices  were
"effective"  --  higher  than  cost  and  higher  than  corresponding  domestic  prices.
Foreign  exchange  for  imports  was centrally  allocated  at the  o.ficial
exchange  rate,  although  allocation  became  less  important  once  retention  quotas
were introduced.  The  planning  commission  or,  after  1984,  the  ministry  of
foreign  trade  reviewed  import  plans  and  requests  to  purchase  foreign  currency.
All transactions  were carried  out  at the  official  exchange  rate,  set
periodically  by the  Xa:ional  Bank  of Poland  (central  bank).  The reform  plan
provided  for  a "submarginal"  exchange  rate,  a rate  that  would secure  the
profitability  of  75-85  percent  of hard  currency  exports.  But  only on one  or
two occasions  did  the  actual  rate  conform  with this  target.  Because  of the
fear  of increasing  inflation,  the  zloty  was kept  overvalued  throughout  the
1980s,  except  for  two  short  periods  following  devaluations  in 1982  and  1986.
Antidumping  actions  of the  European  Community
In the 19809,  the  European  Community  (EC)  initiated  a series  of
antidumping  actions  against  chemical  imports.  The  Conseil  Europeen  des
Federation  de l'Industrie  Chimique  (CEFIC),  "one  of Europe's  most effective
industrial  lobby  groups"  (Cookson  1990),  acting  "on  behalf  of Community
producers  representing"  either  "the  whole"  or "the  bulk  of Community
production  of the  product  in question"  introduced  a number  of complaints
-6-against  chemical  imports. 4 Exactly  how  many,  we do  not know.  EC procedures
(see  Eymann  and  Schuknecht,  PRE  WPS, forthcoming)  require  that  member  states
be consulted  before  a formal  investigation  is initiated,  and  there  is  no
published  record  of complaints  that  do  not  pass this  political  test.  What  we
do know is that  in the  period  1980-85,  forty-nine  complaints  against  narrowly
defined  chemical  imports  qualified  for  formal  investigation  (table  1).'
Almost  all of these  petitions  alleged  dumping  by exporters  from  more
than one  country;  overall,  102  investigations  were initiated.  Of these,  53
concerned  organic  chemicals,  27 inorganic  chemicals,  12  plastic  materials,  and
10  other  types  of chemical  products.  The  greatest  number  of complaints  for  a
single  country  were lodged  against  U.S. firms  (17  cases),  particularly  for
organic  chemical  exports.  As a  group,  the  Eastern  European  state  trading
nations  were subject  to the  greatest  number  of complaints.  Eastern  European
firms were named in  48 ceaes: of these, 21 concerned organic chemicals (40
percent  of all  organic  chemical  cases),  14  inorganic  chemicals  (52  percent),
and 9  plastics  (75  percent).  Industrial  country  exporters  were cited  in 36
cases,  and  developing  country  exporters  (including  China  and  Yugoslavia)  in
18.
Reasons  for antidumping  complaints
Why the  rash of complaints  against  chemical  imports  in  the  earlv  1980s?
To begin  with, 1980-82  was a  difficult  time for  the  Western  European  chemical
industry.  Output  stagnated  in 1980  and  1981  and dropped  in 1982,6  domestic
prices  were  weak (CEFIC),  and  debt  in the  industry  was high.  Large  European
companies,  many in  business  since  the  nineteenth  century  and  joined  in close
but informal  relationships  that  "would  today  be regarded  as an illegal  cartel"
(Cookson  1990),  competed  fiercely  with foreign  producers.  They  used
antidumping  procedures  to keep  out suppliers  who threatened  their  market-
sharing  and  price-setting  practices.
This  motive  is  well documented  in  Messerlin's  investigation  (1989)  of
the  relationship  between  antidumping  and  antitrust  cases  in the  EC. In the
-7-antitrust  cases  againct  chemical  firms,  the  EC Cormission  found  that  industry
agreements  existed  that  had "as  their  object  or effect  the  prevention,
restriction,  or distortion  of competition  within  the  common  market"  (Article
851  of the  EC Treaty).  Many cther  EC industries  that  were accused  of
antitrust  activities  were involved  in the  antidumping  compl.ints  as well.
Examples  include  EC producers  of low-density  polyethylene  (antidumping  cases
were brought  against  Czechoslovakia,  East  Germany,  Poland,  and  the Soviet
Union,  among  others),  polyvinyl  chloride  (Czechoslovakia,  East  Germany,
Hungary,  and  Romania  were among  the  accused),  and  soda  ash (Bulgaria,  East
Germany,  Poland,  Romania,  and the  Soviet  Union).  Collusion  could  have  been
involved  among  EC producer  of other  products  as  well, for  which  antitrust
investigations  had not  yet  been launched.
Messerlin  (1989,  12)  and  other  studies  (UNCTAD  1982)  also  show  that  EC
producers  might  have  tried  to use  antidumping  complaints  to temporarily  affe(-
prices.  The  announcement  of  an investigation  has  a "freezing"  effect  on
falling  prices  (as  in the  case  of low-density  polyethylene  and  polyvinyl
chloride).  The  prices  remain  stable  for  the  period  of investigation  and  then
increase  sharply  if the  case  is "positively"  resolved  and  protective  measures
are imposed.  Several  empirical  studies  of antidumping  measures  have documented
their  more frequent  use in combating  low-price  imports  than  lower-export-than-
home-price  imports.7
These  two  motives  well explain  the  large  number  of complaints  lodged
overall  by the  EC chemical  industry,  as  well as a number  of cases  against  its
largest  competitor,  the  U.S.  industry.  In their  struggle  against  low-price
imnorta.  Rutropean  companies  used  all  the  weapons  at their  disposal,  including
antidumping  complaints.  But  what explains  the  large  number  of complaints
against  producers  from  Eastern  Europe,  which  accounted  for  a very small
percentage  of the  E- iarket  and  did  not exercise  any  significant  competitive
pressures?8
The  answer  is straightforward:  because  it  was easyl  It is  easy  --  both
politically  and  technically  --  to  make a case  against  a socialist  country.
-8-And, for  both ethical  and  venal  reasons,  socialist  exporters  will  be inclined
to go along  rather  than  to strenuously  resist.
As to the  political  dimension,  it  was easy  to get  the  EC Commission  to
act  against  exporters  from  state  trading  countries.  These  are  communist
countries,  and  who likes  communists?
In cases  suca  as these,  characterized  by little  threat  that  higher
export  priceo  wqould  bring  forward  a significant  increase  of exports,  the  EC
tends  to offer  a  minimum  price  agreement  (an  "undertaking")  as remedy.  Against
more dynamic  exporters,  particularly  Japan  and  Korea,  the  EC has  come
increasingly  to refuse  price  underta:ings  and  to impose  antidumping  duties
instead.9  A price  undertaking  is a  money-making  outcome  for  the  exporter,
particularly  one for  whom the  alternative  of larger  volume  at lower  prices  is
not available.
On a technical  level,  antidumping  cases  against  socialist  countries
certainly  beer out  a premise  stated  in the  preface:  dumping  is  whatever  you
can  get the  government  to  act against  under  the  antidumping  laws.  An important
feature  of the  EC trade  regime  is that  it  distinguishes  between  different
import  sectors:  different  product  categories  and  different  origins  of imports
and,  in some  cases,  different  importing  regions.  Imports  from state  trading
countries  and  China  constitute  a special  case  and are  subject  to separate
leaolQatlon.  Several  of these  countries  are  not  members  of the  GATT.  For those
that  are,  the terms  of accession  provide  for  gradual  elimination  of (numerous)
bilateral  restrictions.  In conflict  with the  GATT,  the  EC continues  to
maintain  a large  number  of such  restrictions,  which explains  the  existence  of
separate  regulations.  Procedures  in  EC (and  in other  countries')  antidumping
cases  offer  a special  methodology  for  establishing  dumping  in the  case  of
nonmarket  economies,  where costs  and  prices  are  massively  distorted.
To  establish  normal  values  for  sales  from  these  markets,  a similar
country  is selected  as a reference  market  for  cost  and  other  data.  The  choice
of a reference  market,  while  nominally  based  on similarity  with the  home
market  of accused  firms,  is to a large  extent  arbitrary  and  open to  influence
- 9  -by the  petitioner  (Messerlin  1989,  17-20).  In the  low-density  polyethylene  and
polyviniyl  chloride  antidumping  cases,  Sweden  was selected  as the  reference
market  even  though  the  antitrust  cases  had found  the  cartels  to be
particularly  powerful  in Sweden  and  Swedish  prices  to  be "the  highest  possible
prices  of reference."  Similarly,  in the sodium  carbonate  case,  Austria  was
selected  despite  objections  by accused  exporters  that  Austria  was a highly
protected  market  that  was  monopolized  by the  Belgian  compar'  Solvay,  the  main
petitioner  in the  antidumping  case.  The  EC Commission  acknowledged  these
reservations  in its  review  of the  case  in 1989,  admitting  that  Austria  was not
a proper  reference  country  because  "its  only  producer  was protected  by price
controls  and  a system  of import  licensing  which  kept  prices  on the  domestic
market  high" (Official  Journal  of the  European  Communities  1989,  L 131).
And finally,  the defense  put  up by  Eastern  European  producers  could  be
counted  on to be of deplorable  quality  --  and  so to be unconvincing.  True  to
form,  the  presentations  made  by the  Polish  producers  in the  cases  reviewed  for
this  paper  were  weak in  both form  and  substance  (particularly  where  knowledge
of  market  conditions  and  rules  was necessary).  Indicative  of their  quality  is
the following  excerpt  from  a  pro  memoria  sent  by a Polish  chemical  producer  to
the  EC Commission:
Summing  up the  above,  we must state  that Poland - despite  the
relatively  low  costs  of production  of [the  product]  --  has  never
conducted  the selling policy which --  according to Article VI GATT
--  would  be considered  as dumping  and  causing  injury  to the
producers  in  EC area.  The  Article  VI says  that  the subject  of
dumping  is the  product  sold  in another  country  at lower  value than
its  normal  one.  That is  why  we would suggest  to;
1.  cancel  a  provisional  antidumping  duty  imposed  on [the
product)  originating  in  Poland;
2. repay  the  duty  covered  by us;
3. in order  to eliminate  unnecessary  competition,  causing
losses  to the  producers  in  EC area  and Poland,  we engage
- 10  -ourselves  to sell [the  product)  to  EC market  at  prices  not
lower  than  those  quoted  in the  undertaking  attached  hereto.
It is no  wonder  that  the  EC investigators  were inclined  to share  the
petitioners'  arguments  --  they  were  more elegant,  better  documented,  and  in
understandable  English.
The  eagerness  of  EasFern  European  exporters  to accept  price  undertakings
came  in part,  but only  in part,  from  their  unfamiliarity  with antidumping
procedures.  At least  as important  were the  business  ethic  of  socialist
managers  and  the system  of accountability  within  which  they  worked,  which
motivated  them toward  the  outcome  that  the  antidumping  system  generates.
The first  dimension  of control  of enterprise  managers  --  and therefore
their  first  concern  --  is their  accountability  to higher  authorities:  not
their  profit  and  loss statement.  In a socialist  economy  the  planning  process,
not the  interaction  of market  forces,  determines  what  will be done  and  who
will do it.  The  responsibility  of managars  is to carry  out  the  plan  as
smoothly  as  possible.  An antidumping  action  --  particularly  one  that  ended
with a penalty  duty  --  would  be interpreted  as  poor execution.  (Because  of the
political  sensitivity  of trade  with the  West,  diplomatic  conduct  would  be a
particularly  important  dimension.)  In the  commercial  ethic  of the  socialist
system,  the appropriate  way to resolve  a problem  created  when one  enterprise
attempts  to  move into  another's  market  is to negotiate,  to find  a  way to
accommodate  all interests.  The  system  functions  through  economic  adjustments
decided  through  political  mechanisms,  not  through  market  forces.  Within  this
system,  an antidumping  duty  would  be interpreted  as a failure  to  negotiate  an
o4tcoma  that  accommodates  all  interests.  An uLLdeL  Lakiteg,  on  Lhe  orher  hand,  is
compatible  with the  commercial  ethic  of the  system.  It is also  compatible  with
socialist  procedures  for  determining  what economic  adjustments  will be made.
It is the  way of doing  business  in a  managed,  nonmarket  economy.
Whatever  the  motives  for  the  petitions,  their  success  rate  was high.  Of
the  total  of 102  cases  initiated,  only  20 resulted  in findings  of no injury  or
no dumping.  Duties  were imposed  in 33  cases  and  price  undertakings  were
_  11  -accepted  in 49 cases.  Success  came  even  easier  in  the  cases  involving  the
state  trading  countries  (including  China)  --  85 percent  of cases  ended  with a
finding  of dumping  and  injury,  and  60 percent  were resolved  through  price
undertakings.  'nd  the  duties  imposed  were quite  hefty,  averaging  15.8  percent.
The  ad  valorem  equivalent  of the  price  undertakings  was probably  close  to that
rate  as  well.
The  cases  against  imports  from  Poland
Seven  cases  involved  chemical  exports  from  Poland,  which  also
constituted  a major  part  of all  EC antidumping  actions  against  Poland  in the
1980s.10  Six  cases  resulted  in a finding  of dumping  and injury;  five  of them
ended  in price  undertakings.  The  seven  cases  involved  nine  Polish  companies  --
seven  producing  enterprises  and  two foreign  trade  organizations  (the  affected
products  are in  parentheses):
* Zaklady  Chemiczne  Oswiecim  (trichloretylene),  the  third  largest  chemical
enterprise  in  Poland  with 7,370  employees  and  sales  in 1985  of about  $238
million.
* Mazowieckie  Zaklady  Rafineryjne  i Petrochemiczne  "Plock"  (polyethylene),
the  largest  chemical  producer  in  Poland  with 8,500  employees  and sales  in
1985  of  more than $2  billion.
* Huta  Miedzi  Legnica  (copper  sulphate),  a copper  mining  company.
* Zaklady  Chemiczne  Tarnowskie  Gory (copper  sulphate),  a chemical  producer
with 824  employees  and  sales  in 1985  of about  $20  million.
* Fabryka  Materialow  i  Wyrobow  Sciernych  (silicon  carbide  and artificial
corundum),  a  producer  of abrasives.
* Inowroclawskie  Zaklady  Chemiczne  im.  B. Ruminskiego  (sodium  carbonate),
with 2,520  employees  and  sales  in 1985  of about  $50  million.
* Janikowskie  Zaklady  Sodowe  (sodium  carbonate),  a  medium-size  enterprise
with 1,990  employees  and sales  of about  $50  million  in 1985.
*  Inter-Vis  (silicon  carbide  and  artificial  corundum),  a foreign  trade
organization.
- 12 -a  Ciech  Import  and  Export  of  Chemicals  Ltd (remaining  products),  a foreign
trade  organization  established  in 1945  in  Warsaw.  The second  large.
Polish  foreign  trader,  it  had 1,100  employees  in 1986  and  turnover  was
about  $7 billion,  of which  exports  to the  West amounted  to about  $700
million  and  imports  from  the  West $1.3  billion.
Effects  of the  antidumping  actions
Taking  into  account  the  conditions  under  which  Polish  producers  and
exporters  of chemical  products  operated  in the 1980s,  three  possible
conclusions  about  the  effects  of the  antidumping  actions  emerge:
* The  export  policies  of producing  enterprises  could  not  have been
affected  because  they  did  not exist.  Polish  production  enterprises  had no
control  over  the  direction  or  prices  of their  exports.  Until  about  1985,  they
were only  moderately  interested  in exporting  because  the  quality  requirements
were high and  benefits  were modest.  That  attitude  changed  when eligibility  for
the  retention  of foreign  exchange  earnings  was  widened  and the  rules  governing
their  use  were relaxed.
* Production  (and  incomes)  could  have suffered,  but only  in the  case of
enterprises  that  exported  a significant  share  of their  production  to  EC
markets  and  that faced  low  domestic  demand.  Most enterprises  should  have  had
no difficulty  finding  customers  on short  notice  for  shipments  that suddenly
became  available,  given  the  small  value  of exports  affected,  their  small  share
in total  industry  sales  (about  15  percent,  less  than  half of it directed  to EC
marKets),  and  persisLeLiL  :shuL La6  ,  uctrs  ,.tr  pr'o.c  vCta)
in the  economy.
* For  the same  reasons,  the foreign  trade  organizations  should  have  had
no difficulty  finding  alternative  markets,  although  they  might  have suffered
short-term  drops  in exports.  Obviously,  exports  to the  EC  would  have  been
permanently  damaged.
- 13 -Information  and comments  obtained  from  company  representatives  appear  to
confirm  these  conclusions.  Before  presenting  that  information,  however,  it is
necessary  to  warn the reader  about  its  low  quality.  Polish  companies  keep  poor
records,  and company  memories  were seriously  disrupted  by the recent  radical
changes  in  management.  No data  were obtained  from  Oswiecim  (producer  of
trichloretylene),  and  the information  from  other  companies  was often
incomplete.  There  were no other  sources  of data  to fill in  the gaps.
First,  company  statistics  do  not indicate  that  intentional  dumping
occurred.  As a rule,  export  prices  were  higher  than  domestic  prices.  There
were three  exceptions.  One  was sodium  carbonate;  export  prices  received  by
Jarikowo  in 1984  were some 19  percent  lower  than those  received  for  domestic
sales,  while for  Inowroclaw  in the  period  1982-85,  the  difference  averaged
about  33 percent  (note,  however,  that  the  antidumping  case  was initiated  in
1982).  According  to both  producers,  the  price  differential  resulted  because  of
the  low,  regulated  COMECON  prices.  The  losses  were made  good through
subsidies.  For  Janikowo,  subsidies  amounted  to almost  56 percent  of export
revenue;  for  Inowroclaw,  they  amounted  to 5.3  percent  in 1982,  14.7  percent  in
1983,  13.3  percent  in 1984,  and  8.9  percent  in 1985.  The second  case  is that
of copper  sulphate,  for  which  export  prices  were below  domestic  prices  in
1984.  In the  third  case,  silicon  carbide,  export  prices  were lower  than
domestic  prices  in 1985  and 1986.  In  neither  case  did  producers  receive
subsidies  to cover  any  of their  losses.
Second,  all  the  producing  companies  claimed  that  the  EC actions  had  no
significant  impact  on their  performance  either  at the  time  the  actions  were
taken  or later  and.  therefore,  that  they  made  no adjustments  in production  and
price  policies  or structure.  This  claim  is  supported  by data  on production
output  in the  year  of initiation  of the  action  and in the  three  preceding  and
three  following  years  for  four  companies  that  provided  full  information  (table
4).  In all  four  enterprises,  output  was larger  in  each  of the  years  following
the  year of initiation  than  in the  year  of initiation  or in the  preceding
period.  Clearly,  the  antidumping  actions  did  not  disrupt  total  production,
- 14 _which grew  steadily  during  the investigations  and  after  the  imposition  of
import-restricting  measures.
Similarly,  the  volume  of total  exports  was not  affected  (table  5).  Only
the  drop in the  total  volume  of trichloretylene  and  sodium  carbonate  exports
in the  year  of initiation  and of trichloretylene  in the first  year following
initiation  could  have resulted  from  the  EC antidumping  actions.  In all  other
cases,  exports  do  not appear  to have  been  affected  by the  antidumping  actions.
As  would  be expected,  however,  the  volume  of exports  to the  EC suffered
considerably  (table  6).  On average  they  declined  some  32 percent  in  the  year
of the initiation,  falling  another  20  percent  in the  following  year.  The
initial  drop  was due  mostly  to a  very large  decrease  in sodium  carbonate
exports;  the  decline  in  the following  year (that  is,  the first  year in  which
the  import-restricting  measures  had their  full  impact)  affected  all  exports.
The  import-restricting  measures  imposed  on three  products  proved  to be
relatively  soft,  since  export  volumes  returned  to their  previous  levels  and
continued  to grow.  In the  case  of artificial  corundum  and  polyethylene,
however,  damage  was more severe,  and  export  volumes  continued  to fall  into  the
third  year after  the initiation.
Finally,  the  prices  producers  received  for  their  exports  may  have  been
affected  by the  antidumping  actions.  The  export  prices  of products  for  which
price  undertakings  were accepted  increased  and  kept on growing  in the
following  years  (table  7).  In the  case  of sodium  carbonate  (Inowroclaw),
however,  on  which an antidumping  duty  was imposed,  the  prices  received  by
producers  fell  and stayed  at a lower  level  than  before  the  antidumping  action.
This  difference  may indicate  that  antidumping  actions  nad some  intLuence  on
export  price  --  foreign  trade  organizations  might  have  raised  their  prices  for
exports  to other  markets  (including  the  COMECON  countries,  where  prices  were
negotiated  on the  basis  of "world"  prices)  up to the  EC levels.  However,  the
importance  of the  antidumping  actions  in this  process  could  not have  been
large,  since  world  chemical  prices  increased  quite  strongly  in the  first  half
of the 1980s.  For example,  they  increased  by more than  50 percent  in  Denmark,
- 15  -Italy,  and  Sweden;  by 32 percent  in  Australia;  by 22  percent  in  Germary  (the
largest  export  market  for  Polish  producers);  and  by 16 percent  in the  United
States  (CEFIC).
In conclusion,  the  EC antidumping  actions  seem  to  have had  very little
effect  on the  Polish  chemical  industry.  They  did  not  affect  the  performance  of
the  industry  as a  whole  or that  of individual  producing  enterprises.  They  did
not have  any impact  on total  exports  of the  products  involved,  but they  might
have affected  export  prices  to some  degree.  Only  in the  geographic  composition
of exports  was the  impact  statistically  significant:  faced  with new obstacles
to the  EC  market,  exporting  companies  had to find  alternative  customers  --  and
they did  so in a very short  time (apparently  in the  Middle  and  Far  East
markets).  Since  the  value  of trade  involved  in these  cases  was so small,  the
importance  of this  alteration  for  Polish  trade  relations  with the  EC was
negligible.
A  final  comment
All in all,  a tempest  in a teacup?  Apparently  so.  The  Polish  chemical
industry  got  caught  up in a  battle  waged  by the  EC chemical  industry  to
preserve  the  EC market  for  itself.  Since  the  Polish  share  of that  market  was
very small,  and since  the  performance  of the  Polish  companies  did  not depend
on it,  they  emerged  for  the  battle  unscathed.  However,  an aftertaste  of the
experience  remained:  interviews  with representatives  of the  companies  involved
indicate  that  their  recollection  of  the antidumping  investigations  is  very
vivid.  Wnen pressed  for  reasons,  they  say  that  what impressed  them  the  most
about  these  actions  was the  inconvenience  associated  with them,  the  burden  of
preparing  explanations  and  reports  for  the  Polish  authorities,  and  the
international  aspect  of the  activities.
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- 17 -Table  I  European  Community  antidumping  cases  In the  chemical  sector,  1980.85
Initialion  Outcome
Product  Counry  Off Jour C  Dwi,  lype  Off Jour L  Date
I  Chemical  fertilizers  United  States  47  2/1980  Duty  39  2/1981
2  Vinyl acetate  monomer  United  States  169  7/1980  Duty  129  5/1981
3  l_ithium hydroxide  Soviet Union  181  7/1980  Duty  228  8/1980
4  Styrene monomer  United  States  189  7/1980  Duty  154  6/1981
5  Gelatine  Sweden  219  8/1980  No  dumping  320  11/1980
6  Furfural  Dominican  Republic  219  8/1980  No dumping  189  7/1981
Spain  219  8/1980  No injury  189  7/1981
China  219  8/1980  No injury  189  7/1981
7  Orthoxylene  Puerto  Rico  286  11/1980  Duty  270  9/1981
United  States  286  11/1980  Duty  270  9/1981
8  Paraxylene  United  States  286  11/1980  Duty  296  10/1981
Virgin Island  286  11/1980  Duty  296  10/1981
Puerto  Rico  286  11/1980  Duty  296  10/1981
9  Phenol  United  States  51  3/1981  Duty  12  1/1982
10  Codeine  Czechoslovakia  71  4/1981  No  injury  16  1/1983
Hungary  71  4/1981  No  injury  16  1/1983
Poland  71  4/1981  No ln,ury  16  U11983
Yugoslavia  71  4/1981  No  injury  16  1/1983
11  Polypropylene  film  Japan  i;5  b/1981  Undenaking  172  6/1982
12  Oxalic acid  China  241  9/1981  Duty  148  5/1982
Czechoslovakia  241  9/1981  Duty  148  5/1982
Gernan  Dem Rep  241  9/1981  No  injury  148  5/1982
Hungary  241  9/1981  No injury  148  5/1982
13  Trichloretylene  Czechosiovakia  271  10/1981  No dumping  223  7/1982
German  Dem Rep  271  10/1981  Undertaking  308  1/1982
Poland  271  10/1981  Undertaking  308  1111982
Romania  271  10/1981  Undertaking  308  11/1982
Spain  271  10/1981  Undertaking  308  11/1982
Un.ited States  271  10/1981  Undertaking  308  11/1982
14  Polyvinylchloride  Czechoslovakia  332  12/1981  Undertaking  18  1/1983
German  Dem  Rep  332  12/1981  Undertaking  274  9/1982
Hungary  332  12/1981  Undertaking  274  9/1982
Romania  332  12/1981  Underthicing  274  9/1982Table  1 European Community  antidumping  cases  In the chemical  sector, 1980485 (cont.)
Initi4tion  Outcome
.Product  County  Off Jour C  Date  Trpe  Off Jour L  Date
15  Decambromodiphenylether  United  States  337  12/198&  Undertaking  319  11/1982
16  Peracetamol  China  337  12/1981  Undertaking  236  8/1982
17  Methylamines  German  Dcm  Rep  79  3/1982  Duty  348  11/1982
Romania  79  3/1982  Undertaking  238  8/1982
18  Acrylonitrile  United  States  84  4/1982  No injury  101  4/1983
19  Bisphenol  United  States  93  4/1982  Duty  199  7/1983
20  Light sodium  carbonate  Bulgaria  93  4/1982  Duty  32  2/1983
German  Dem Rep  93  4/1982  Duty  32  2/1983
Poland  93  4/1982  Duty  32  V1983
Romania  93  4/1982  Duty  32  2/1983
Soviet Union  93  4/1982  Duty  32  2/1983
21  Thiophen  United  States  122  5/1982  Undertaking  295  10/1982
22  Perchlorethylene  Czechoslovakia  133  5/1982  Undertaking  371  I12/982
Romania  133  5/1982  Undertaking  371  12/1982
Spain  133  5/1982  Undertaking  371  12/1982
United  States  133  5/1982  Undertaking  371  12/1982
23  Sodium carbonate  United  States  147  6/1982  Duty  64  3/1983
24  Copper  sulphate  Yugoslavia  161  6/1982  Duty  55  3/1983
25  Urea  United  States  i79  7ii982  Undercaking  2ii  8/1983
26  Barium  chloride  China  207  8/1982  Duty  228  8/1983
German  Dem  Rep  207  8/1982  Duty  228  8/1983
27  Methenamine  Czechoslovakia  211  8/1982  Undertaking  40  2/1983
German  Dem  Rep  211  8/1982  Duty  iSi  6ii83
Romania  211  8/1982  Undertaking  40  2/1983
Soviet Union  211  8/1982  Duty  151  6/1983
28  Polyethylene  Czechoslovakia  230  9/1982  Undertaking  138  5/1983
German  Dem Rep  230  9/1982  Undertaking  138  5/1983
Poland  230  9/1982  Undertaking  38  S/19U3
Soviet Union  230  9/1982  Undertaking  138  5/1983
29  Xanthan  gum  United  States  253  9/1982  No injury  268  9/1983
-19  -rable  I European  Community  antidumping  cases  In the chemical  sector,  1980.85  (cont.)
Initiation  Outcome
Product  Cowty  Off Jour C  Date  i)ype  Off Jour L  Date
30  Cellulose  ester  resins  United  States  299  11/1982  Undertaking  106  4/1983
31  Copper  sulphate  Czechoslovakia  331  12/1982  Duty  274  10/1983
Soviet Union  331  12/1982  Duty  274  10/1983
32  Dicumyl peroxide  Japan  46  2/1983  Undertaking  329  11/1983
33  Lithium  hydroxide  China  98  4/1983  Undertaking  294  10/1983
34  Synthetic  fibre  knitting  yarn  Turkey  102  4/1983  Undertaking  67  3/1984
35  Choline  chloride  German  Decn Rep  109  4/1983  Undertaking  117  5/1984
Romania  5  4/1983  Undertaking  117  5/1984
36  Vinyl acetate  monomer  Canada  180  7/1983  Duty  170  6/1984
37  Pentaerythritol  Spain  244  9/1983  Undertaking  88  3/1984
38  Artificial  corundum  China  261  9/1983  Undertaking  340  12/1984
Czechoslovakia  261  9/1983  Undertaking  340  12/1984
Spain  261  9/1983  No dumping  255  9/1984
Yugoslavia  261  9/1983  No dumping  255  9/1984
39  Propan-l-ol  United  States  275  10/1983  Undertaking  106  4/1984
40  Sensitized  paper  Japan  292  10/1983  Undertaking  124  5/1984
41  Oxalic acid  Brazil  67  3/1984  Duty  26  1/1985
Spain  67  3/1984  No dumping  239  9/1984
German  Dem Rep  67  3/1984  Undertaking  239  9/1984
42  Pentaerythntol  Canada  72  3/1984  Duty  13  1/1985
Sweden  72  3/1984  Undertaking  254  9/1984
43  Copper  sulphate  Bulgaria  90  3/1984  Undertaking  275  10/1984
Hungary  90  3/1984  Undertaking  275  10/1984
Poland  90  3/1984  Undertaking  41  2V1985
Spain  90  -i-v  Nng  no 1
44  Paraformaldehyde  Spain  145  6/1984  Undertaking  282  10/1984
45  Artificial  corundum  Hungapy  201  7/1984  Undertaking  340  12/1984
Poland  201  7/1984  UndertaIdng  340  12W1984
Soviet Union  201  7/1984  Undertaking  340  12/1984
46  Silicon carbide  China  202  8/1984  Undertaking  287  10/1986
Czechoslovakia  202  8/1984  No dumping  287  10/1986
Norway  202  8/1984  Undertaking  287  10/1986
Poland  202  8/1984  UndertakIng  287  10/1986
Spain  202  8/1984  Terminated  287  10/1986
Soviet Union  202  8/1984  Undertaking  287  10/1986
Yugoslavia  202  8/1984  No dumping  287  10/1986
- 20  -Table I European  Community  antidumping  cases in the chemical sector, 1980485  (cont.)
litiiation  Outcome
Prdua  o  Offr  Jour C  D."e'  7;,,,  O  nf.four  I.  Pate
47  Po!ystyrene  sheet  Spain  205  8/1984  Duty  198  7/1985
48  Glycinc  Japan  265  10/1984  Duty  218  8/1985
49  Chieqium  Fulphate  Yugoslavia  276  10/1984  Duty  321  11/1985
Off Jour C or 1.  is Official  Joumal of the European  Comnmunities  series C or L.
Source: Official Journal  of dhe  European  Cotnunities.
- 21  -Table 2 Share of the Polish chemical industry in




Global production  ?3.4
Global production by industry  8.5
Sales by industry  7.2
Value added by industry  8.2
Investment
Capital investment by industry  10.4
Employment
Total employment  1.7
Employment in industry  5.9
Foreign Trade
All imports  13.2
Hard currency imports  23.3
All exports  10.4
Hard currency exports  11.6
Source: Rocznik Statystyczny  (Annual Yearbook)
1986.
- 22  -Ta ,le 3 Financial  and economic prices for selected chemical  products in Poland, 1985
(1)  (2)  Ratio  Ratio
Domestic  Ecotonomic  (i)/(2)  (1)1(2)
price  price  at 240  at 400
Product  (US$Iton)  (US$/ton)  ZL/$(%)  ZLI$(%)
Ammonia  103  105  98  59
Antiline  700  680  103  62
BOPP  1,875  2,500  75  45
Caustic soda  76  120  63  38
Hexane  158  158  100  60
High wet modulus viscous fiber  1,400  1,200  117  70
MDI/PMDI (15/85)  1,638  2,120  77  46
Melamine  600  1,(00  60  36
Methanol  154  154  100  60
MTBE  202  202  100  60
Polinosic  viscose fiber  1,300  1,300  100  60
Polypropylene  530  800  66  40
Propylene  245  245  100  60
Sulfuric acid  31  31  100  60
Urea  105  100  105  63
Column notes: (1) Exchange rate: US$1 = ZL 240; (2) economic prices are border prices
adjusted for internal transport based on f.o.b. Western Europe prices for exports of
chemical products.
Source: World Bank 1987.
- 23  -Table 4 Evolution  of total production  (volume)  for four Polish firms before  and after
antidumping  action
(percentage of production in year of initiation of antidumping action)
Tarnowskie  Huta  Inowro-
Year  Gory  Legnica  claw  Plock  Average
-3  0.79  0.65  0.69  0.28  0.60
-2  1.04  0.77  1.03  0.91  0.94
-1  0.40  0.75  1.01  0.89  0.76
Action  1  1  1  1  1
+1  1.17  1.14  1.23  1.09  1.16
+2  1.21  1.21  1.50  1.18  1.28
+3  1.26  1.25  1.57  1.19  1.32
Source: Information provided by Polish firms.
Table 5 Evolution  of total chemical exports (volume) before and after antidumping  action
(percentage of exports in year of initiation of antidumping action)
Silicon  Artif cial  Copper  Sodium
Year  Trichloretylene carbide  corundum  sulphate  carbonate Polyethylene  Average
-3  1.35  na  na  na  na  na  1.35
-2  1.36  na  na  na  1.26  na  1.31
-1  1.33  na  na  0.63  1.16  0.83  0.99
Action  1  1  1  1  1  1  1
+1  0.91  1.07  na  1.44  1.50  1.05  1.19
+2  1.27  0.91  na  1.27  3.02  1.14  1.52
+3  1.39  0.97  na  1.34  2.91  1.05  1.53
Source: Information provided by Polish firms.
- 24  -Table 6 Evolution  of chemical exports (volume) to EC markets  before  and after antidumping
action
(percentage of export, in year of initiation of antidumping action)
Siliconi  Artificial  Copper  Sodium
Year  Trichloretylene carbide  corundum  sulphate  carbonate Polyethylene  Average
-3  0.95  2.33  0.17  na  ra  na  1.15
-2  1.57  1.88  0.15  na  4.24  na  1.96
-1  0.98  1.06  0.33  0.63  3.85  1.09  1.32
Action  1  1  1  1  1  1  1
+ 1  0.48  0.90  0.98  0.94  0.78  0.73  0.80
+2  0.68  0.84  0.55  1.30  1.10  0.45  0.82
+3  0.85  1.02  0.53  1.03  1.28  0.40  0.85
Source: Information provided by Polish firms.
Table 7 Evolution  of export prices (in U.S. dollars) received  by chemical producers  before and
after antidumping  action
(percentage of prices in year of initiation of antidumping action)
Tamowskie  Huta  Inowro-
Year  Gory  Legnica  claw  Plock
(copper  sulfate)  (copper  sulfate)  (sodium  carbonate)  (polyethylene)  Average
-3  0.77  na  0.97  na  0.87
-2  1.11  na  1.28  1.51  1.30
-1  1.13  1.00  0.74  0.78  0.92
Action  i  1  i  1  1
+1  1.07  1.04  0.97  1.03  1.03
+2  1.06  0.98  0.94  1.29  1.07
+3  1.28  1.13  0.99  1.10  1.12
- 25  -Notes
1. The chemical industry in Poland is defined to include not orly the usual
processing of raw materials into intermediate chemicals, fertilizers, and
pharmaceuticals, but also the  refining of crude oil, the mining of chemical
raw materials, the manufacture of  consumer goods, and wholesale and retail
trading.
2. For example, in 1984 Poland was the world's third largest producer (in
terms of tonnage of output) of acetylene and naphthalene and fourth largest in
sulfur, carbide, and nitric acid, but only the twelfth largest in polystyrene,
synthetic rubber, and artificial fibers, fourteenth largest in plastics, and
fifteenth largest in polyvinylchloride (PRC 1986, 131-33 and 139-70).
3. The reform was a result of the social unrest in 1980 and the emergence of
the "Solidarnosc" trade union. It was based on the principles of independence,
self-financing, and self-government of enterprises. The number of licensed
foreign traders increased from 109 in 1982 to 232 in 1983, 289 in 1984, 'nd
361 in 1985.
4. CEFIC, the European Chemical Industry Federation, is the Brussels-based
organization representing fifteen National Chemical Federations of Western
Europe. Most of the major chemical companies with headquarters in Europe are
corporate associate members.
5. Only products classified in CCNN chapters 28 to 40 were included. That
means that several products of chemical origin, such as artificial and
synthetic fibers, were excluded.
6. After 1982, however, chemical production grew rapidly: 15 percent during
1983-86, 1 percent in 1986, 3.9 percent in 1987, 6.7 percent in 1988, and 3.4
percent in 1989.
7. See, for example, the recommendation in a report on the Australia's system
(Gruen 1986, iv) to "reduce the discrepancy between the concept of 'unfair
trading practices' as it is applied within Australia and as it is applied by
Australia to its imports.... (This] aim is to be achieved by returning the
antidumping system to its original role of combating dumping as opposed to
combating low prices."
8. The share of Eastern European exports in total EC imports of chemical
products never exceeded 3 percent; their share in non-EC imports was 10
percent.
9. Tle poirnt  is documented in Hindley (1988, 445-64).
10. During the 1980s, eighteen antidumping investigations  were initiated by
the EC against Polish exporters. The antidumping actions affected chemicals
(8); electric products (5);  mineral products (2); and wood products, metal
products, and musical instruments (one each). In fourteen of these cases,
injury was found and antidumping duties were imposed (in two instances) or
price undertakings were agreed on. Antidumping cases against Poland in the
chemielnT tn4ustry included the seven cases listed in table 10.1 and an eighth
investigation, opened in 1988, against imports of methenamine from Poland,
Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia (Official Journal
of  the  European  Communities  C  322,  1988). It was concluded by the acceptance
of price undertakings (Official  Journal  of  the  European  Communities  L 104,
1990).
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